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Douglas C. Bennett and Kenneth E. Sharpe
Is There a Democracy "Overload"?
A principal feature of recent neoconserva-
tive thought has been the scapegoating of de-
mocracy for a host of political and economic
ills—from declining governmental competence
to budget deficits and inflation. Our political
system, the argument goes, has become "over-
loaded" by demands from the citizenry, and
democracy itself is to blame for stimulating
these excessive demands. Less democracy is
the proposed remedy.
Samuel Huntington provided the first influ-
ential formulation of this argument in the
Trilateral Commission's Report on the Govern-
ability of Democracies.' A "democratic surge"
in the 1960s had raised the level of popular
expectations and group demands on the gov-
ernment, he argued, and this had resulted in
both an expansion of governmental activity and
a decline in governmental authority. He saw a
widening gulf between expectation and institu-
tional capacity, which led him to worry about
the viability of democracy. To avoid "over-
load," he urged moderation in the level of
demands. "The effective operation of a demo-
cratic political system requires some measure
of apathy and noninvolvement on the part of
some individuals or groups."
All that varies in later versions of this idea
are the alleged symptoms of political and eco-
nomic ill health. While Huntington is con-
cerned with the sapping of governmental au-
thority, far more numerous and influential are
This article is part of a series, appearing intermittently
in our pages, on the general theme of problems of
democracy in advanced industrial countries. The series
has been made possible by a grant from the Joyce
Mertz-Robert Gilmore Foundation, to which we ex-
press our gratitude. — EDS.
statements that see economic illness as the
consequence of rising individual and group
demands. If rising demands overload the fed-
eral budget and create deficits, then public-
sector borrowing and the resultant expansion of
the money supply cause, or at least aggravate,
the inflation we have been experiencing for the
last decade. 2
The strongest indictment of democracy for
our economic woes comes from Samuel
Brittan, who blames it for "the English sick-
ness"—inflation, unemployment, lack of pro-
ductivity, and balance-of-payment troubles.
Organized interest groups, especially "union
monopolies," insist upon larger shares of the
national product. Insofar as they are success-
ful, they may bring about a measure of unem-
ployment, since some goods are being offered
at a price above the market equilibrium. These
and other groups then clamor for government
relief from this unemployment. And here elec-
toral competition works its mischief: "Politi-
cians," writes Brittan, "compete in the market-
place for the votes of an extensive electorate in
the same way that oilmen bid for oil or sales-
men bid for customers." Democracy thus en-
courages these rising group demands. 3
If all this is true, what are we to do? One
relatively mild prescription urges constitu-
tional amendments to limit government spend-
ing. Huntington's cure is greater reliance on
nondemocratic sources of authority (expertise,
seniority, experience, special talents) to place
necessary limits on democracy; he also coun-
sels "self-restraint." Samuel Brittan implores
the intelligentsia to give up their infatuation
with egalitarianism. "The ideal of equality," he
argues, "has done immense damage to my
country." Perhaps the most ominous prescrip-
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tion comes from Robert Lubar, an editor of
Fortune. Drawing together the work of these
overload theorists, he assigns democracy "a
large share of the blame for the economic
troubles that afflict the advanced nations." "If
democracy fails to cope with inflation, the
system itself may be in danger," Lubar con-
cludes. "Democracy helped put us in our
present fix and it has to get us out. Otherwise a
desperate nation may well reach for ways that
imperil our liberty." 4
This style of thought is founded upon an
intellectual conception of democracy that pre-
vailed over the last half-century: the economic
theory of democracy, which was most lucidly
formulated by Joseph Schumpeter in the
1930s. It conceives of democracy merely as a
political mechanism, modeled on the market,
"in which individuals acquire the power to
decide by means of a competitive struggle for
people's votes." 5 An important distinction is
drawn between elites and masses, though both
are assumed to be motivated by the same
calculus of benefit and loss. Elites are seen as
political entrepreneurs who seek to gain power
and its rewards by offering programs (prod-
ucts) more attractive than those of their com-
petitors. At intervals, competing sets of elites
present themselves to the electorate—"the
masses." The masses are seen as consumers
who spend their votes in the political market-
place to purchase programs and their sponsor-
ing decision-makers. The masses are taken to
be involved in politics only marginally and
intermittently, with their main objective that
government satisfy their demands.
All the overload theorists share four major
assumptions of the economic theory of democ-
racy:
(1) Men and women are conceived as atomis-
tic, self-interested, rational individuals who
seek to maximize pleasure through accumulat-
ing material goods.
(2) Political participation is essentially the
making of demands upon government.
(3) Democracy, because it is reduced to a mere
marketlike mechanism, cannot affect the char-
acter of the citizenry or the content of these
demands.
(4) Finally, the economic theory of democracy
is taken to be a factual description of what
democracy "really is," not a moral or prescrip-
tive theory of what it "should be."
THERE IS A CONCEPTUAL FUZZINESS to the over-
load theory that makes it difficult to criticize
it. Analyses rarely specify what kinds of de-
mands cause overload through their excess.
Demands on government for more transfer
payments to the elderly and unemployed might
strain limited budgets; but other demands do
not. The anti-Vietnam War protests and cur-
rent protests against increased militarization
can be seen as demands that government spend
less: here increased demand could produce less
overload. By selective examples, the overload
theory implies that all popular demands—and
democracy itself—lead to excess.
The overload theory also tends to take "sup-
ply" as a given. It assumes, for example, that
taxes cannot be raised, even though the U.S.
tax rate is relatively low compared to many of
our major capitalist competitors. Moreover,
rarely is the allocation of supply questioned.
The very conception of "overload" itself is
hazy. While its advocates claim that govern-
ment is being "overloaded" by demands that it
spend (or do) more, what often appears (or
feels) to them as "overloaded" are private
corporations—as with demands for more gov-
ernment regulation of occupational safety or
the environment.
Despite these ambiguities, we cannot simply
dismiss the overload thesis. If we employ a
market metaphor to describe democracy, there
certainly is some meaning to "demand" and
"supply," so that there indeed can be an excess
of demand over supply—an "overload." Sim-
ply put, what the overload theorists have dis-
covered is a corollary of the economic theory
of democracy: democracy conceived as a politi-
cal market lacks the built-in equilibrating
mechanism of the economic market. In the
continuous pull and haul between sellers and
buyers, and even in very imperfect markets,
economic wants have a mechanism that pushes
toward balance between supply and demand.
But a political market has no equivalent mech-
anism.
When originally propounded, the economic
theory of democracy contained no such worry
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about overload, for it was assumed that the
citizenry would be politically active only
sporadically. So long as the Western democra-
cies functioned smoothly in the years after
World War II, overload was only a theoretical
possibility. But when political participation in-
creased in the late 1960s and early 1970s and
Western democracies found themselves with
economic ills, Huntington et al. discovered
"overload." Forgetting that theirs is but one
model of democracy, they claimed the problem
to be inherent in democracy itself.
S ELF-RESTRAINT: Solution for Overload?
Given the basic assumptions of the economic
theory of democracy, there is nothing surpris-
ing about the solutions propounded by its theo-
rists. When "demand" is greater than "sup-
ply," and supply cannot easily be increased (as
in the current climate of stagnation), demand
must be limited. But how? Either the citizenry
must exercise self-restraint in its demands
upon government, or there must be some kind
of external restraint—in milder form, corporat-
ism or depoliticization; in more coercive form,
authoritarianism. Anyone committed to de-
mocracy would prefer the first alternative. But
can the economic theory of democracy provide
a satisfactory basis for self-restraint, or must it
rely on undemocratic methods? One possibility
is that self-restraint could be founded in self-
interest; another, that it might be founded in
shared values.
SELF-INTEREST AS A SOURCE OF RESTRAINT? Ac-
cording to the economic theory of democracy,
people enter the political market as rational,
self-interested individuals who seek to maxi-
mize fulfillment of their largely material de-
sires. The following argument maintains that
this self-interest could also encourage individ-
uals to restrain their demands on government.
Social cooperation is in your interest. With-
out it there will be conflict and anarchy, and it
will be impossible for you to have any security
in the pursuit of your interests. A democracy is
the best political form for such cooperation
because it is more likely than any other politi-
cal system to control the rulers and thereby
allow your interests to be represented and pro-
tected. This possibility, however, presents two
serious problems.
If self-restraint is rational because democ-
racy is valued, but democracy is valued merely
because it generally serves one's self-interest,
then the value of democracy, and of self-re-
straint, can be displaced by something of more
immediate value to oneself. As soon as compel-
ling arguments can be made that one's private
goals are best pursued by violating democratic
processes, it is irrational for the self-interested
individual either to support democracy or re-
strain his pursuit of private goals.
The other difficulty here is the free-rider
problem. It is possible that rational, self-inter-
ested individuals who continue to value democ-
racy and know that excessive demands can
undermine democracy will still find it irratio-
nal to exercise self-restraint. In many situations
each person finds it rational to pursue private
interests even though everyone acting this way
would threaten a shared goal. Rational individ-
uals will then see no reason to restrain their
own excessive demands since doing so as indi-
viduals is not sufficient (or even necessary) to
sustain democracy. The egoist in the political
marketplace does best when other people re-
strain their demands and he does not. Such an
individual will be a free rider, carried along on
the self-restraint of others.
CAN SHARED VALUES be a source of self-re-
straint? The rational, self-interested individuals
assumed to inhabit the marketplace thus pro-
vide fragile building blocks for the self-re-
straint needed to support democracy. But if
this is true, why has democracy seemed so
stable in the United States? Is it not possible,
perhaps, that the citizenry does not mainly
consist of the rational egoists assumed to be its
mainstay by adherents of the economic theory
of democracy? Perhaps, in the past, the actions
of most citizens were informed by shared val-
ues of trust, compassion, social responsibility,
public-mindedness, and national community,
which did restrain them in the pursuit of pri-
vate or selfish goals.
Before the 19th century, political theorists
emphasized the importance of such civic vir-
tue. They saw individuals who were ruthless in
behalf of private goals as a corrupting force
that invited despotism. Rousseau argued that
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democracy would cease to function as soon as
individual self-interest rather than the common
good guided citizens. John Stuart Mill argued
that there was a certain natural sympathy in all
of us that, if nurtured by education, would
provide reliable "internal sanctions" restrain-
ing greed. More recently, Fred Hirsch has
emphasized the importance of such shared
values for the continued functioning of even
the economic market. "Truth, trust, accep-
tance, restraint, obligation—these are among
the social virtues grounded in religious beliefs
which are also now seen to play a central role in
the functioning of an individualistic, contrac-
tual economy." Hirsch stresses this, we must
note for the future course of our argument,
because he is concerned about the dangers
posed by the erosion of such a "supporting
social morality." 6
The significance of such shared values was
not lost even on Schumpeter when he formu-
lated his market model of democracy. He ar-
gued that one condition for the success of a
democratic society was a "social stratum"
(such as the English aristocracy) with high
"moral character" from which politicians
would be chosen by the electorate. Another
condition was at least a minimum of demo-
cratic self-control—a high enough moral as
well as intellectual level among both electorate
and politicians. Most of those that have
adopted his conception of democracy, however,
put little emphasis on shared values. Only
recently, when the overload theorists con-
cluded that the current "crisis" was the result
of a lack of restraint, has some attention been
given to civic virtue. Brittan, for example,
mentions the importance of "the moral heri-
tage of the feudal system" as a source of
democratic self-restraint. The notion that per-
sonal success was firmly connected with "duty
performed" helped limit "the demands on the
sharing-out functions of the state." But "the
feudal legacy was bound to be extinguished by
the torchlight of secular and rationalistic in-
quiry, which was itself so closely associated
with the rise of capitalism."
Even such cursory attention to shared values
reveals a crucial, hidden assumption in the
economic theory of democracy: if equilibrium
is to be maintained between demand and sup-
ply, self-interest must be internally tempered
by a public morality. But such belated recogni-
tion of civic virtue also reveals an important
limitation in the whole theory. If it remains
within its own assumptions, the theory is un-
able to give an account of shared values. It
conceives of no basic part of human character
or psychology—such as John Stuart Mill's
"sympathy"—which could serve as a founda-
tion for such civic virtue. The men and women
participating in the democratic market, like
the economic market itself, are simply self-
interested pursuers of private goals. And since
these individuals are taken to exist prior to any
social institutions, it is impossible for the the-
ory to recognize a historical process by which
human nature is shaped. Such basic assump-
tions thus make it difficult for overload theo-
rists to move beyond an ad hoc recognition of
shared values and toward an explanation of the
conditions under which these values are main-
tained or eroded.
L et's now talk of a worse problem. Capital-
ism as much as democracy requires a broad
sharing of certain values—for example, trust
and honesty. In the past, not only religion and
other traditional bases of morality but the
functioning of democracy itself helped sustain
capitalism as well as democracy. Capitalism,
as Schumpeter suspected, cannot be relied on
to reproduce even the minimal shared values
that it nevertheless needs. It may even subtly
undermine them. If so, the attempt to deprive
democracy of an independent moral founda-
tion and justify it instead by a market model
aggravates the problem. There are distinct
dangers in viewing both a society's economic
and political arrangements through the lens of
the market.
(1) AN IMPORTANT FOUNDATION for the shared
values enabling self-restraint is the morality of
the political system itself. As the political sys-
tem becomes more closely entwined with the
economic system, the outcome of the political
economy must be seen as moral and just, if the
value of self-restraint is to be maintained. So
long as shared values had a traditional basis in
custom or religion, there was a built-in, almost
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unconscious check on the pursuit of self-inter-
est: lying, cheating, deceiving, and harming
another to benefit yourself were just plain
wrong. But as religion and other supports for
morality eroded, a conscious, rational basis
became necessary. Mere self-interest (we saw
earlier) was not enough, and this was especially
true when contradictions emerged between
capitalist accumulation and democratic social
reform. The only remaining prop for internal
restraint of self-interest is a conscious sense of
civic duty, the recognition that certain actions
are just and moral because they support a just
and moral society. People foreswear certain
kinds of self-interested actions in the name of
justice. Yet such a sense of justice cannot
simply be tacked on to self-interest. If people
are to be educated to a sense of civic duty, they
must perceive the system itself to be just and
moral.
The theorists of overload crisis have a diffi-
cult time understanding that the foundation for
self-restraint is the larger morality of the po-
litical economy itself. They do not see the
connection between the citizens' view of the
market system and the citizens' willingness to
restrain demands. Why? Because, given the
assumptions of the economic theory of democ-
racy, the individual (with his own wants and
interests) is conceived of as apart from and
unaffected by the democratic system. Democ-
racy simply is a mechanism for aggregating
individual demands. The possibility that the
kind and level of demands made would be
shaped by a view of the morality of the market
system itself cannot be accommodated within
the economic theory of democracy.
This in turn raises two other closely related
problems: the market itself may actually pro-
mote the disappearance of the shared values
upon which it rests, and it may be unable to
reconstruct the necessary shared values once
these are threatened.
(2) THE MARKET ITSELF may help to undermine
the shared values upon which it rests in two
rather distinct ways. The current problems
with our capitalist political economy and the
way these are dealt with by the government
may be perceived as unfair or unjust, thus
undermining the moral justification for self-
restraint. Alternately, the more general work-
ings of the market itself may be encouraging
unrestrained self-interest and discouraging
civic virtue.
The first contention is based on the link
citizens see between the "political market" and
the economic market: they no longer judge
democracy (as perhaps they once did) as a
"working" or "just" system in narrow political
terms but rather by wider political-economic
criteria. Because the overload theorists see
demands as a problem for democracy they miss
seeing the source of these demands in the
injustice of the larger political economy.
Since the New Deal, our government has
gradually come to be seen as responsible for
welfare measures that would ameliorate eco-
nomic inequalities and lessen the risks to the
normal routines of life posed by the market.
Other citizens, often from economically more
powerful classes, have come to see the govern-
ment as responsible for market outcomes in a
different sense: democratic government is ex-
pected to manage the economy to insure
steady, noninflationary growth so as to enable
capital accumulation and profit. This managed
economy goes hand-in-hand with the welfare
state: growth is considered essential to finance
income-maintenance programs, and govern-
ment management of the economy ensures
such growth. Democracy is seen to "work"
insofar as government can accomplish these
twin tasks of reform and accumulation.
Changing historical conditions may be forc-
ing a clash between these tasks. The ebbing of
U.S. hegemony in the international economy,
rising energy costs, declining industries, and
persistent stagflation all are making it harder
for the democratic welfare state to finance the
social reforms needed to lessen the inequalities
of the economic market. Particularly when
accompanied by huge military expenditures,
the continued financing of these reforms has
called forth fiscal and monetary policies that
interfere with growth and accumulation.
In frustration, people clamor for the govern-
ment to do something. The overload-crisis theo-
rists, however, overlook the deeper roots of the
problems and fail to see that citizens may be
making these demands because they perceive
the political economy—capitalism, and not
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just democracy—as dishing out results that are
unfair and unjust.
There is also a more subtle way in which the
market may help undermine shared values: by
encouraging the pursuit of self-interest and
discouraging action based on virtue. Hirsch,
for example, argues that the precapitalist and
preindustrial social morality that served to con-
tain economic individualism within permissible
limits "has diminished with time and with the
corrosive contact of the active capitalist val-
ues—and more generally with the greater ano-
nymity and greater mobility of industrial soci-
ety." Drawing on a variety of data, Robert
Lane has argued that the market has definite
consequences for the shaping of personality. It
has increased self-reliance and cognitive com-
plexity, and it has taught "a version of justice
where work or contribution to the economy is
rewarded." But the market also erodes civic
virtue:
Through its emphasis on transactions it has
eroded some of the sources of sociocentrism. By
its destruction of sources of humane values, its
instrumentalism, it has made identity hard to
achieve and its amoral ism has made difficult the
identification with moral values.'
(3) SHARED VALUES (social morality, civic vir-
tue) cannot be reconstructed through a market
method. Schumpeter recognized that the na-
tional character and habits necessary for demo-
cratic self-control could not be produced by the
democratic method itself, but he did not elabo-
rate on these difficulties. The shared values
that undergird self-restraint and allow a de-
mocracy to function are, like public goods,
things that benefit the whole society. Yet, like
other public goods, these social norms cannot
be provided through the market. Everyone
may know that self-restraint is something that
would benefit the entire society, but the demo-
cratic marketplace never offers people the
choice between a disorderly society ruled by
excessive demands and an orderly society ruled
by reasonable, self-restraining people. Instead,
it gives its citizens a choice among various
politicians who rarely speak for a party with a
coherent program, offering instead discrete,
piecemeal proposals. The market makes it ra-
tional for individuals to decide each of these
matters on the basis of individual self-interest,
despite any unintended consequences.
A central element in the critique of the
economic theory of democracy is that this
conception fails to provide for the inculcation
of democratic values through participation.
Theorists who make this criticism—such as C.
B. Macpherson—deny that human beings are
essentially and unchangeably self-interested
utility maximizers. They argue instead that the
social order and particularly its political and
economic institutions deeply affect human
personality. If participation were nothing more
than occasional trips to the polls, the citizenry
would never learn the public morality needed
for the survival of democracy. "A political act,
to be done only once in a few years, and for
which nothing in the daily habits of the citizen
has prepared him," John Stuart Mill argued,
"leaves his intellect and his moral dispositions
very much as it found them."
These critics are attacking not democracy
but the economic model of democracy. Draw-
ing on such earlier theorists as Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, John Stuart Mill, and G. D. H.
Cole, they argue for the educative importance
of participation in making political decisions,
not just the election of—or pressure on—deci-
sion-makers. Such participation should take
place at the local and national level, as well as
in the workplace. Public-spiritedness, respect
for others' virtues, a sense of responsibility, a
sense of justice, and the proper self-restraint
that follows—in short, a democratic charac-
ter—all these are being developed by partici-
pation, though they may be something that
already exists.
The theorists of economic democracy erro-
neously reduce human beings to rational ego-
ists, call that egoism human nature, and then
describe (or justify) a market method for ag-
gregating these interests without ever realizing
that the method itself discourages anything but
the development of such utility maximizers.
The more people are shaped in the image of the
model, the less well, ironically, the model will
work; for the democratic character, discour-
aged by the market method, is no longer there
to support it. The theorists of participatory
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democracy, on the other hand, argue for trans-
forming democracy.
There is, however, one important assumption
these theories of more participatory democracy
share with the economic theory, and the pitfall
to which this leads warrants exploration. The
economic model of democracy, as we have
been arguing, is blind to the relationship be-
tween its market method and social morality.
The economic theory divides facts from values,
and it insists that values are merely a matter of
individual taste. This doctrine will not make it
possible to say which values ought to be en-
couraged. Perhaps because they share the doc-
trine of the subjectivity of values, the theorists
of participatory democracy also tend to be
silent about the kind of public morality that
ought to be encouraged. In insisting on more
active participation as a necessary condition
for democracy, they argue for replacing one
method with an alternate, better method. And
thereby they risk expecting far too much of a
mere method.
More participation will not itself automati-
Arthur L. Fox
Dissenters Win Right
to Space in Union Papers
I n a precedent-making case, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that members
of the National Rural Letter Carriers Association
(NRLCA) have a right of access to their union's
newspaper. The case arose when the NRLCA lead-
ership refused to run a paid advertisement in the
Rural Letter Carrier submitted by the Knox County
(Tenn.) Local. The ad appealed to the membership
to reject the 1981 contract negotiated by the
NRLCA leadership with the U.S. Postal Service.
The Knox County Local ... was comprised of
125 letter carriers, could not afford a mailing to the
64,000 members covered by the new contract and
looked for other means of communicating opposi-
tion to the agreement. Inasmuch as the Rural Letter
Carrier regularly carried commercial advertise-
ments, the Knox County members hired an ad
agency to prepare and submit camera-ready copy
of their message, together with the cost of a full-
page ad. The journal's editor refused the ad be-
cause, in his words, it "would just create internal
strife." The local and several members sued the
NRLCA claiming that the Union was stifling commu-
nication in violation of their Title 1 right of free
speech. They argued that there could be no demo-
cratic referendum over the new contract if mem-
bers voting on it were not exposed to competing
viewpoints. Relying upon decisions upholding the
First Amendment freedom of the press, the district
court refused to order the NRLCA to print the ad
and dismissed the action.
The court of appeals reversed. It rejected the
notion that a union may lawfully restrict expression
because of its message. On the contrary, the court
said, the democratic process cannot function if, on
a matter as important as contract ratification, there
is no debate. The court observed that free and
enlightened self-government can exist only where
there is "a rational interchange of ideas on issues
of great moment—the very goal envisioned by the
framers of the First Amendment.... By refusing to
allow [dissident members] access to its union-wide
publication, the NRLCA foreclosed the only reason-
able avenue for the effective communication of
opposition to the new agreement."
Members of other unions will undoubtedly
want to know whether they, too, can now force their
union publications to print their messages on union
policy matters. That depends. Technically, the Sixth
Circuit opinion prohibits only discrimination based
upon the content of members' speech. Unions may
try to argue that the Letter Carriers' decision ap-
plies only where the union officers advocate one
side of an issue in a publication that routinely
accepts advertisements or member statements.
Even then, unions may contend that members can
force journals to print their viewpoint only where
the paper is the exclusive forum of communication
on a particular subject; if there is some other rea-
sonable means of disseminating opposing view-
points, the union may argue, it must be used in-
stead of publication in the journal.
However, in the landmark Letter Carriers' deci-
sion, the court says much more. But exactly how far
it does go may be determined by the next court that
is asked to decide, under different circumstances,
whether the members of some other union can
force their publication to print their message on
union policy.
Meanwhile, the Letter Carriers' decision is an
encouraging breakthrough for union democracy.
For the first time, the right of union members to
express dissenting views in their own union news-
paper has been recognized in federal court.
— Union Democracy Review, January 1984	 q
cally create democratic character. Democratic
theorists must therefore also argue for a public
morality, a conception of social and economic
justice that can deal with such issues as the
proper distribution of sacrifice and gain, espe-
cially in a time of recession or slowed growth.
The social virtues learned through participa-
tory democracy must be grounded in the just-
ness of the political economy. Unless the ques-
tion of the justness of the political economy is
squarely faced, participatory democracy will
be as inadequate as market democracy.
THE OVERLOAD-CRISIS THEORISTS use impres-
sionistic data and a bold example or two to
demonstrate the excessive nature of demands,
but their thesis has not stood up well to system-
atic empirical tests. Surveying the available
evidence for the 1970s, Hugh Heclo concludes
that
. almost nowhere could political parties be
found trying to outbid each other in promises to
continue rapid expansion in social policy
spending. . . . [Moreover,] survey information
for the United States and Western Europe shows
a considerable willingness in the general public
to act sensibly and lower expectations in re-
sponse to (and in anticipation of) unfavorable
events.'
Nevertheless, the overload-crisis argument
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scrapping altogether the economic theory of
democracy from which it so easily derives.
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